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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif{-Appellant,
-vsSTEVEN LYNN CLARK,

Case No.
12877

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Appeal from the dismissal of charges against defendant by the Second Judicial District Court, in and
for Davis County, State of Utah, in harmony with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 ( 1953). See State v. Callahan, 488 P.2d 1048, 26 Utah 2d 304 ( 1971); State v.
Shumway, Case No. 12124, Supreme Court of Utah,
September 28, 1971.
DISPOSITION IN LOlVER COURT
On February 24, 1972, a motion to dismiss was
heard before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge
of the Second Judicial District, Davis County, State of
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Utah. At that time, after hearing argument, the judge
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann.§ 77-65-2 (1953).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks the reversal of the district court
decision.
STATEl\IENT OF THE FACTS
On November 11, 1971, defendant, Steven Lynn
Clark, was arrested for the alleged crime of burglary
in the second degree. Also, on the 11th day of N ovember, 1971, a complaint was issued by the Honorable
S. Mark Johnson, Bountiful City Judge, upon the oath
and testimony of Ron Ballantyne, a Bountiful City
Police Officer, who investigated the alleged crime.
Defendant Clark was returned to the Utah State
Prison sometime thereafter as he was on parole, being
a resident of the Halfway House.
On November 1.5, 1971, defendant Clark signed
and had delivered to John W. Turner, Warden of the
Utah State Prison, a notice and request for final disposition of pending charges pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 77 -65-1 ( 1953) .
Preliminary hearing was held on February 1, 1972,
before Bountiful City Judge, S. :Mark Johnson and
defendant was bound over to district court.

a
An information was signed and filed by Dale E.
Stratford, District Attorney for the Second Judicial
District on February 10, 1972, alleging the defendant
Clark committed the felony of burglary in the second
degree.
Arraingment on the charge was held on February
15, 1972, and a plea of not guilty was entered at that
time. Trial was set for February 25, 1972.
On February 24, 1972, a motion to dismiss was entertained before Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, District Court
Judge of the Second Judicial District on the grounds
that a trial was not held within 90 days pursuant to
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-65-1 (1953).
Judge Hyde, after arguments ruled he did not have
jurisdiction to hear the matter as trial was not commenced within 90 days after defendant signed the notice
for final disposition.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT AND
THEREFORE, THE DISMISSAL OF THE
CHARGES 'VAS IMPROPER.
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-65-1 (1953) states:
" (a) 'Vhenever a person has entered
upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever
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during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any
untried indictment, information or complaint
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within ninety days after he shall have caused
to be delivered to the county attorney of the
county in which the indictment, information or
complaint is pending and the appropriate
court written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information
. t .... "
or compI am
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-6.5-2 states:
"In the event that the action is not brought
to trial within the period of time as herein
provided, no court of this state shall any longer
have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried
indictment, information or complaint be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice."
The question to be answerd by the court is a simple
one. From what point in time does the 90 day period as
set out in Ptah Code Ann. § 77-6.5-1 ( 1953) begin to
run?
The Utah Supreme Court has in two recent cases
come to seemingly two contradictory results regarding

the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953),
hence, the reason for clarification sought herein.
In State v. TVilsori, 453 P.2d 158, 22 Utah 2d 361
( 1969), the court felt that the 90 day period ran from
the date of filing of the notice if there was at least a
complaint pending against the defendant at that time.
Justice Tuckett, with Justices Callister and Ellett
concurring, stated in upholding the dismissal:
"The legislature has expressed its intent
in simple and concise language which nee.ds no
construction by the court. The case before us
clearly falls within the provisions of the statutes above referred to and we need only comment about one aspect of the case."
In JVilson there was only a complaint against the defendant at the time of filing the notice for final disposition.
The same court a year and a half later decided a
case which is in direct opposition to JJTilson. In State v.
Belcher, 475 P.2d 60, 25 Utah 2d 37 ( 1970), the defendant was accused of having made an assault upon a
guard with malice aforethought. A complaint was filed
on August 6, 1D69. A preliminary hearing was held on
September 19, 1969. Prior to that date, the defendant
served notice upon the Warden of the Prison requesting final disposition of the charges which he alleged
were pending aganist him. This notice was made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 ( 1953).
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Justice Ellett, with Justices Crockett, Callister,
Tuckett and Henroid concurring first outline the
function of filing a complaint:
"In felony cases the filing of a complaint
is the process by which the defendant is held
until a preliminary hearing can be held to permit the magistrate to determine if the
defendant should be bound over to the district
court for trial. ( 21 Am.J ur.2d Crim. Law §
443) . . . The accused cannot plead to the
complaint in a felony matter but must plead
to and be tried under the information or indictment, as the case may be. It is only when
the charge against him is a simple misdemeanor
that the plea is made to the complaint and he
can he tried thereunder."
There were three reasons why the Court upheld the
conviction as attacked under Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1
( 1953) . The first two do not concern us here due to
the factual situation. The third, however, is the hinge
upon which the whole matter swings. The Court stated
regarding defendant's request for final disposition:
" ... and in the third place, there was no
way to dispose of the matter finally until the
information was filed. His request was premature. He could not enter a plea of guilty to
the complaint; and if the complaint had been
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dismissed, the matter would not be disposed of
finally, since the dismissal would not be res
judicata and another complaint could be filed
at any time within the statute of limitations
(four years from date of crime, Sec. 77-9-2,
U.C.A. I953) ."
It is clear then that the more recent decision of Belcher
should be controlling over
in the instant case.

The defendant in the instant case served the Warden with notice on November I5, I971. This was prior
to the filing of the information which occurred on February IO, I972. Under the Belcher decision that notice
was premature since the defendant could not plead to a
complaint in a felony matter.
The information in the present case was not signed
until February IO, 1972. Thus the 90 day period would
not have elapsed until .May I3, I972.
Therefore, the District Court on February 24,
1972, the date of the hearing on the motion to dismiss,
still had jurisdiction over the matter and should not have
dismissed for lack of it.
CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits that the lower
court decision be reversed. This Court in Belcher clearly stated that a notice served upon the Warden prior
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to filing of an information is premature. Furthermore,
Belcher is controlling in the present situation since it is
later in time than fVilson.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General

Attorneys for Respondent

